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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
c·ARL STURDAVANT,
Pla.int.iff and Appellant)

Case No.
8132

-vs.-

KENNETH COVINGTON,

Defenda;nt and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEl\tfENT OF FACTS
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff and appellant will be referred to throughout
this brief as plaintiff; defendant and respondent as
defendant.
All italics are ours.
B.

THE FACTS

This action resulted from a collision when a 1948
Chevrolet sedan, owned and operated by defendant, ran
against the rear end of a 1947 Cadillac sedan, owned
and operated by plaintiff. The collision occurred at
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ap·proximately 3 :10 o'clock p.m., on the 17th day of
November, 1951, in the Town of American Fork, Utah,
on Main Street ap·proximately 60 feet east of the intersection of Main Street with Center Street. Main Street
is the main highway, U.S. 91, which runs through American F·ork in an east-west direction. Said street consists of
four driving lanes and two parallel parking lanes. Center
Street runs in a n~rth-south direction, intersecting Main
Street in the approximate center of town (Exs. "A", "B",
"C", "D" and "E"). Traffic at said intersection is regulated by a semaphore signal. A Texaco Service Station
is located on the southeast corner, and a two-story bank
building on the northeast corner of said intersection. On
the corner of the bank building there is a clock with faces
showing 'vest and south (Exs. "A", "B", "C", "D" and

"E").
Plaintiff was traveling in an easterly direction along
the outside driving lane of Main Street. Defendant was
traveling a short distance behind in the same direction
and in the same lane of traffic.
Plaintiff was on his way to Los Angeles, California
(R. 73). Defendant was on his way to work at Geneva,
Utah (R·. 161). It is undisputed that plaintiff stopped for
the red light at the intersection of 1fain and Center
Streets (R. 162). Defendant testified that he was following about 100 fee't behind plaintiff, that he slowed down
for the light, closing the gap between them, but that the
light turned before it was necessary for him to stop (R.
170, 171), that he was about 15 or 16 feet behind as plaintiff p·roceeded through the intersection and that both he
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and plaintiff were traveling at approximately 10 miles
per hour (R. 163); that plaintiff came to a sudden stop
at the point of the collision and that he (defendant) could
not stop in time to avoid crashing into the rear of plaintiff's automobile, at a speed of about 5 miles per hour
(R. 167, 174). No other vehicles were in the immediate
vicinity (R·. 163). Plaintiff testified that as the light
turned green a small dog trotted into the intersection
and along in an easterly direction in front of his car
(R.. 76); that he pToceeded at ap.proximately 6 miles per
hour, or less, and honked at the dog (R. 77) ; that at a
point abou't 60 feet east of the intersection the dog suddenly stopped (R. 77, 107) ; that he immediately applied
his brakes and came to a stop and that almost immediately thereafter defendant crashed into the rear of his
automobile (R. 78). The next thing he knew he wa.s
stopped about 50 feet beyond the point of impact and in
the same lane of traffic, though sligh.tly to the right of
where he had been traveling (R. 78).
Defendant testified that he did not see a dog. He
admitted, however, that plaintiff told him about the dog
almost immediately after the collision (R. 163, 165). ·The
p:laintiff testified that just after the collision defendant
told him (R. 78) : " 'Where did you come from~ I failed
to see you up until this time, this is the first I seen you.'
And that was after the accident. And he says he was
sorry but he was looking at the clock across the corner
and he wondered what happened, how come it was so
late."
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Defendant testified that he looked at the clock about
the time he crossed the west pedestrian lane, ascertained
that it showed 3:10 o'clock p.m., and gave said ti1ne to the
investigating officer as the time of the collision (R. 163,
172). The officer remembered that son1ething 'vas said
about the· clock ( R. 157).
Defendant testified that his auton1obile left skid
marks from his application of brakes. He later admitted,
however, that his automobile left no skid marks (R. 175).
The police officer testified that he issued a citation
to defendant for the reason stated on the back of the accident report, "Failure to keep proper lookout" (R. 159,
Ex. "G") ; that he obtained the information on the accident report by questioning the drivers (R. 156). It appears on the accident report that defendant was traveling
a:t a speed of 20 miles per hour when the danger 'vas first
noticed, and 15 miles per hour at impact. Furthermore,
the accident rep·ort leaves a blank next to the question
of the distance when the defendant first noticed the
danger (Ex. "G").
The repair bills for both- automobiles were introduced
in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit "F·". They show a
rep·a.ir bill on plaintiff's auto1nobile in the smn of $992.42,
and defendant's automobile in the sum of $227.65.
Plaintiff testified that his windows were closed and
that he had no opportunity to give an arm signal (R.
110, 112); also that his lights were checked at CalO'arY
0
. '
Canada on the same trip (R. 73).
Defendant testified on cross-examination concerning
plaintiff's brake lights as follows (R.. 192) :
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"Q.

Mr. Covington, did you at any time see the
brake lights of Mr. Sturdavant's car before
the impact~
A. I don't remember.
Q. There were brake lights~
A. I don't remember if he had them.
Q. You testified in your deposition you didn't
see those lights; is that your testimony now~
A. Yes."

On redirect examination he testified as follows (R.
193):

"Q.

***

You testified you pulled up behind Mr.
Sturdavant's car before the intersection~
A. Yes.
Q. And from then on you watched his car~
A. Yes.
Q. And until he stopped could you see his tail
*

lights~

A. Not until he stopped, no.
Q. I't wasn't lighted up until he stop,ped, is that
so~

A.

That's right."

Then, on recross examination (R. 193):

"Q. I am a little confused, Mr. c·ovington. Isn't
this your testimony in the deposition that
was taken, page 11, 'Did you see the brake
lights of Mr. Sturdavan't's car~ A. No.'
Did you make that answer to that question~
• * • • •
A. Yes."
In the pleadings plaintiff p·rayed for damages for
pers-onal injuries -and costs of repairs for his automobile.
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Defendant counterclaimed, praying for da1nages for personal injuries and costs of repair for his auton1obile.
At the conclusion of the evidence plaintiff requested
instructions that as a matter of law defendant \Yas guilty
of negligence which pToximately caused plaintiff's injuries and damage and that as a matter of la\v plaintiff
was free from contributory negligence. (See plaintiff's
Requested Instructions Nos. 1 and 3, R. 23, 25). These
requested instructions were refused by the trial court
and duly excepted to by plaintiff. Plaintiff likewise made
a motion for a directed verdict in his favor on defendant's
counterclaim. The trial court submitted the issues of
defendant's and plaintiff's negligence to the jury, both
as to plaintiff's complaint and as to defendant's counterclaim. His instructions on these issues were likewise duly
excepted to by plaintiff's counsel. (See the Court's Instructions Nos. 7, 11, R. 53, 55, and plaintiff's exceptions
to said instructions R. 200).
The jury rendere·d verdicts of no cause of action on
both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclain1
(R. 61, 62).
STATEMENT OF POINTS.
P·OINT I.
AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY
OF NEGLIGENCE, WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE
COLLISION.

POINT II.
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
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ARGUMENT
P·OINT I.
AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY
OF NEGLIGENCE, WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE
COLLISION.

The trial court instructed the jury in part as follows
(R. 53) :
Instruction No. 7

" * * * In this case the plaintiff has the· burden
of proving by a p.reponderance of the evidence
that the defendant was negligent in one or more
of the particulars set forth in Instruction No. 1,
and that such negligence proximately caused the
plaintiff's injuries and damages. And unless you
find that the plaintiff has sustained this burden
of p·roof you must find your verdict in favor of
the defendant, 'no cause of action'."
Plaintiff excepted to Instruction No. 7 upon the
grounds and for the reason that as a matter of law
defendant was guilty of negligence (R. 200).

Utah Code An.nota,ted, 1953, Section 41-6-62 (a), provides:
"The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed
of such vehicles ·and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway."
It is plaintiff's position, supported by the weigh't of
authority, that the statutory and common law requirement of reasonableness and prudence imposes upon a
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following driver th·e duty of 1naintaining such control
over his automobile that he can stop short of collision in
the event a leading automobile should suddenly stop,
either with or without warning, and if a driver does not
so operate and control his automobile and a collision
ensues he is negligent a.s a matter of law.
A recent case in point is Miller v.· Cody et 1lX., (Wash.
1953), 252 P. 2d 303. In that case plaintiff was driving
the leading automobile and defendant was following.
Both automobiles were stopped at a "T" intersection,
intending to make left turns. Plaintiff proceeded forward
slowly to determine if the way was clear. After she had
traveled about 8 to 10 feet she suddenly stopped and a
rear-end collision ensued. She had no opportunity to
give pTior warning of her intention to stop. After plaintiff had received an adverse jury verdict, the trial court
granted a new trial, holding as a matter of law, that
defendant was negligent and that plaintiff was free from
contributory negligence. This holding was sustained on
appeal.
In McDwniel v. Capitol Transport Co. Inc., et al.,
(La. 1948), 35 S·o. 2d 38, plaintiff was driving an automobile on a rainy night when he saw several cows crossing the highway. He slowed down to approximately 5
miles p·er hour and a truck, driven by defendant's employee, crashed into the rear of plaintiff's automobile.
The court held that regardless of the distance between
the two vehicles defendant was negligent, it being obvious
that defendant's employee did not 1naintain sufficient
distance between the vehicles and drive at such speed
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that he could avoid striking plaintiff's car in case of an
e1nergency. Here again plaintiff had no op·portunity to
give warning before suddenly slowing down.
In Roberson v. Rodriguez et a.l., (La. 1939), 186 So.
853, the court discussed a statute identical to our Utah
statute. In that case defendant was driving his autoInobile approxiina.tely 40 mph along a two-lane highway,
with a rail on the right side. He came over a slight rise
and approached a horse-drawn wagon proceeding in the
same direction. At the sa1ne time defendant saw an a.utoHlobile approaching from the opposite direction and
applied his brakes without an opportunity to give prior
vvarning. Plaintiff's automobile came into a rear-end
collision with defendant's automobile. From his position
plaintiff \vas unable to see the wagon. The court held as
a matter of la.vv that the proximate cause of the collision
\Vas plaintiff's violation of statutory duty, i.e., his negligence in following defendant's auton1obile too closely and
at such speed that he did not have his automobile under
safe and proper control.
In Sniffen v. Huschle, (N.Y. 1923), 200 N.Y. Supp.
206, defendant's truck was proceeding along Dean Street,
Brooklyn. The truck suddenly stopped without a signal
and plaintiff's automobile ran into the rear of the truck.
The truck driver testified that another truck was approaching, that a boy ran in front of the approaching
truck from the sidewalk and then ran back again immediately in front of defendant's truck, and that he jammed
on the brakes.
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On appeal it was held as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of negligence in following a truck that
was traveling in second speed, at 8 or 10 miles per hour,
while p~laintiff was behind the truck some 10 or 15 feet
and going at a speed of o;ver 16 miles p·er hour. The
court also held as a matter of law that defendant was not
guilty of negligence.
In Phillips v. Haring, (Wis. 1952), 5-! N.W. 2d 200,
262 Wis. 174, plaintiff's automobile was overtaking defendant's tractor-trailer unit. Defendant's vehicle slo,ved
down to 1nake a left turn at an intersection, and a rearend collision ensued. The appellate court held as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in driving so close to defendant's vehicle and at
such speed as not to be able to avoid the collision.
See also Cyclopedia of Autom,obile Law and Pr'actice
by Blashfield, Vol. 2, Sec. 942, at page 143, "'here it is
stated:

"A motorist has right to follow another
motorist at reasonable and safe distance. However, he must govern his speed or keep. back a
reasonably safe distance so as to provide for the
contingency of a car in front suddenly stopping,
maintaining a pToper lookout for the car immediately pTeceding him, and so that he can stop without a collision, or can turn out sufficiently to p·ass
the vehicle in front with.out going across the street
in the way of traffic ap·proaching from the op-
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posite direction, as that will naturally result in
collision with such traffic."
To the same general effect see:

MacNeiJll v. Makos, (Pa. 1951), 77 A. 2d 378,
366 Pa. 465;
Gandy v. Arrant, (La. 1951), 50 So. 2d 676;
Tackett et ux. v. Milburn et al., (Wash. 1950),
218 P. 2d 298;
Sutherland v. Cotter, (Tex. 1949), 226 S. W.
2d 476;
Matthews v. Mound City Cab Co., et al., (Mo.
1947), 205 S. W. 2d 243;
Vienne et al. v. Chalona et al., (La. 1946),
28 s.o. 2d 154 ;
Fu.Zd v. Marylwnd Casualty Co., (La. 1938),
178 So. 201;
Bu,da v. Foley, (Mass. 1939), 19 N. E. 2d 537;
Richmond Coca Cola Bottling Works Inc. t\
Andrews et al., (Va. 1939), 3 S.E. 2d 419;
LeZar v. Qu-aker City Cabs, Inc. et al., (Pa.
1933), 164 A. 105;
Rankin et al. v. Na.sh-Texa.s Co. et al., (Tex.
1934), 73 s. w. 2d 680;
Williamson v. Clark, (Vt. 1931), 153 A. 448;
Ritter et ux. v. Johnson, (Wash. 1931), 300
Pac. 518;
Session v. Kinchen, (La. 1938), 178 So. 635;
Riccio v. Ginsberg, (R. I. 1927), 139 A. 652;
Rust v. Schlai1tzer, (Wash. 1933), 27 P. 2d
571;
Gornstein v. Priver, (Cal. 1923), 221 Pac.
396, 64 Cal. App. 249;
Ghent v. Stevens, (Conn. 1932), 159 A. 94.
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An analogy tnay be drawn bet\veen the case at bar
and Dalley v . .L~fid- Western Dairy Products Co., et al.,
(Utah, 1932), 15 P. 2d 309, 80 Utah 331. There defendant left an unlighted truck on a high\vay at night. The
plaintiff, who collided with defendant's truck, testified
that he was keeping a constant lookout ahead but did
not see the truck until \vithin 15 to 20 feet. The court
held that plaintiff was negligent as a 1natter of la,v,
stating:
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established 'that it is negligence as n1atter of la\v for a
person to drive an automobile upon a traveled
public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians,
at such a. rate of sp·eed that said auto1nobile cannot be stop·ped within the distance at which the
operator of said car is able to see objects upon
the highway in front of him.' "
Here, just as in the Dalley case, the driver \vas unable to prevent collision \vith. a vehicle ahead on the highway.
In the Dalley case the likelihood of an unlighted
obstruction ahead gave rise to an absolute duty on the
part of a driver to avoid a collision. In the case at bar
we submit that the greater likelihood of a sudden stop
by a leading vehicle in the center of a busy n1etropolis
should give rise to a similar absolute duty on the part
of a driver to avoid a collision.
The situation of a person driving too fast for his
area of visibility is certainly analogous to the situation
of a person driving too fast at the distance he is follow·-
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ing a vehicle to be able to avoid collision in case of a
sudden stop by the leading vehicle. We strongly contend
that the considerations involved in adopting rules for
safe driving are the same in both cases.
In 20 .A.1n. J ur. p. 1032, it is said:
"Clearly, if a party, as a \vitness, unequivocally concedes a fact, such concession, for the purposes of trial, has the force of a judicial admission,
and a party is bound there by * * * ."
Defendant testified on cross-exarnination as follows
(R. 171):

""Q.

..._~nd

I presu1ne that as he stopped at the
stop light, then you started to din1inish the
distance between you and him?
..:\. Yes.
Q. You didn't stop at the stop light~
..._\.. No.
Q. But it is your testi1nony, as I understand it,
that you think that he was going about ten
n1iles per hour after he had started up from
that stop sign and down by the point where
he put on his brakes? ·
A. Yes.
Q. And you also testified you were going about
the same speed he was from the stop light

on1
A. Yes.
Q. So that you would have been going about ten
1niles an hour also, and at any rate you didn't
start overtaking him before he put on his
brakes to stop?
A. No.
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Q.

You think you were going about the same
speed he was up to the time when he put o~
'his brakes for the dog; is that your testimony~

A. Yes.
Q. N orw, you watched that red stop, light as you
approached the inteTsection, did you not~
A. Yes.
Q. You were interested in watching that light,
you didn't want to go through that, did you~
A. N'O.
Q. And you also found time somewhere along
there to look at that clock and make a determination as to the time~
A. Yes.
Q. What time was it by the clock~
A. About ten after three.
Q. Did you tell the poJice officer as to the tin1e,
did you let him know what time it was when
he questioned you~
A. I may have done.
Q. Did you tell him you looked at the clock and
it was ten minutes after three at the time of
this accident~
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right~
A. Yes.
Q. Now Mr. Covington, you h·ave had considerable exp,erience as a driver of auto1nobiles
you have testified to~
'
A. Yes.
Q. And is .it your practical experience when you
are gomg through a town where there are
stop lights to maintain sufficient distance
behind vehicles so that if they stop, you will
be able to stop short of a collision~
A. Yes.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
Q.

Is that one of the things that as an experienced driver you make it a point to always
do~

~.\.

Q.
_A_.
Q.
. ..\.

Q.

Q.

Yes.
Do you stay far enough behind the vehicle
ahead that if it stops you can stop~
Yes.
Do you consider that that is safe-driving pra~
tice and proper~
Yes.
* * * *
Do you consider that it is safe driving practice, according to principles of safe driving
practice, that a driver should drive at such
a speed or close behind a vehicle that is a1iead
of hin1 that if that vehicle makes a sudden
stop he is unable to stop short of a collision,
\vould you consider such a driver to be a
careful driver~
Do you consider that to be safe driving
practice~

A.

Q.

_.._-\.
Q.

.A..
Q.

A.

No, I don't.

* * * *
}fr. Covington, after you had started through
this intersection and after Mr. Sturdavant
had started up from his stopped position, did
you continue to drive along at such speed
that you thought you could stop short of
impact with him were he to stop~
If I had knowed he was going to stop, yes.
Did you continue to watch ahead of you as
you traveled down to the point of impact~
Yes.
Did you contilnue to w·atch the Cadillac car
at all ti.mes?
Yes.
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Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

,A.

And when he 1nade the stop u·ere you in sucll
.
t9
position a.s to be able to stop short o.f 11npac ·
No.
Did you do everything you co~tld?
Yes.
And frorn tha.t did you concl1tde tha.t you u~ere
driving too fast to be able to stop U'ere he to
stop ahead of you?
No.
How do yo1t accou,nt for thi,s occurrence?
Well, I was just too close.
Y au were just driving too close; is tha.t right?

Q.
A. Yes.
Q. And if you had been back a. little distance
this wo?.tld have never ha.ppen.ed; is that
right?
A. That's right.
Q. And if you had been going a little slotrer this
would have n.ever ha,p·pened; is that right?
A. That's right."
Consider for a 1non1ent the above testi1nony in the
light of the Court's ov1n Instruction No. 9, \Yherein he
instructs in part as follows (R. 54) :
"You are instructed that in addition to the
duty to keep a proper lookout, a driv·er must at
all times maintain such control over his auton1obile that he will be able to stop, or turn, to avoid
a collision with any other vehicle lawfully traveling upon the highway and reasonably within the
range of his vision. And in the event such dri.ver
fa.ils or neglects to so keep his vehicle under control as set forth above, he is negligent."
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J7~;e

jury had to disbelieve defenda.n.t in order to find
that defenda.11bt wa.s free fran~ neglect. Yet the Court left
this issue to the jury.
It is well settled that a party's evidence is no better
than his cross-examination. This is especially true where,
as here, no effort was made to 1nodify or dispute testimoney elicited by such cross-examination.
Defendant, even by repudiating his own testimony,
faces a dilen1ma. It is clear the defendant was either proceeding too closely and at too great a speed to avoid the
collision (his own testimony), or he \Vas not keeping a
proper lookout (a legitimate inference). The authorities
herein cited uniformly declare tha.t under either circumstance defendant \vas negligent as a matter of law.
The trial court committed serious and prejudicial
error in submitting the issue of defendant's negligence
to the jury.
POINT II.
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

At the conclusion of the evidence plaintiff, in his
requested Instruction No. 3, requested the trial court to
instruct as a matter of law that plaintiff was not guilty
of contributory negligence. The Court refused to give
this instruction and gave instead Instruction No. 11,
which reads as follows ( R. 55) :
"You are instructed that under the laws of
this State no person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving
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an appropriate signal to the driver of a vehicle
in11nediately to the rear, "'~hen there is opportunity to give such signal. Such signal shall be
given by extending the hand or arm downward
from the left side of the vehicle."
Counsel for plaintiff excepted to said Instruction No.
11 in the following language (R. 201):
"Plaintiff excepts to Instruction N u1nber
Eleven and the whole thereof. Particularly Plaintiff calls the attention of the Court to the evidence
indicated in the case which undisputedly shows
that Plaintiff proceeded from a stop light at a
slow rate of speed ranging from ten miles per
hour downvvard, and continued for in the neighborhood of 130 feet at said slow rate of speed.
Particularly Plaintiff calls attention to the evidence of the Defendant himself wherein he states
that he was fully aware that Plaintiff was proceeding at, in his judgment, ten miles per hour
during that one hundred and thirty feet Inore-orless of distance. Plaintiff excepts to the instruction on the grounds that it leaves to the Jury to
decide vvhether failure to give a 'varning signal
that he was proceeding at ten 1niles per hour is
negligence, where the evidence clearly shows that
the Defendant knevv that he was proceeding at
ten miles per hour and the signalling given would
have added nothing tn Defendant's knowledge
under the circumstances. Plaintiff excepts also
on the grounds that a sudden decrease of speed
was not the cause of the collision in this case but
a sudden stop was the cause and the only '"·arning which Plaintiff owed a' dutv if he ·owed a
.
.'
duty at all, to g1ve was a warning of his sudden
stop, and he only owed that duty where an oppor-
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tunity was afforded hi1n to give such a warning.
And the evidence undisputedly shows that there
was no such opportunity for him to give such a
warning in this case."
Instruction No. 11 contains substantially the language of Utah, Code Annotated, 1953, Section 41-6-69,
subsection (c), and is no doubt correct as an abstract
state1nent of the law. When applied to the facts of this
ease, ho\vever, said instruction is clearly erroneous.
The only possible contentions that can be 1na.de as
to plaintiff's contributory negligence are first, that plaintiff \vas negligent in failing to give a slow signal, and
second, that plaintiff was neglegent in failing to give a
stop signal.
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN
FAILING TO GIVE A SLOW SIGNAL.
Counsel for defendant argued to the jury that plaintiff was negligent in failing to give a slo\v signal.
D·efendant testified that he followed plaintiff past
the intersection at a speed of approximately 10 n1ph
and that plaintitf d.id not accelerate his speed. This was
not a normal movement. A watchful follower would have
been thoroughly aware that it was not a normal InoveInen t. Nevertheless the jury was allowed to speculate
that the failure of plaintiff to give a slow signal, even
though he had been creeping along at less than 10 mph
all the way from the red light, constituted negligence
\vhich was the proximate cause of the collision. We call
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particular attention to the language of Utah. Code Annotated, 19.53, Section 41-6-69 (c), which states in part:
"No person shall stop or suddenly decrease
the speed of a vehicle without first giving an
appropriate signal * * * ."
There was no decrease in speed by plaintiff's vehicle
until the final emergency stop. The aforementioned
statute does not require any arm signal whatsoever from
the driver of a slow moving vehicle. Only when there
is a sudden d.ecrease in speed must a signal be given.
PLAINTIF·F WAS. NOT NEGLIGENT IN
F'AILING TO GIVE A STOP SIGNAL.

Ut,ah Code Ann.ota.ted, 1953, Sec. 41-6-69 (c) further
states that:
"No person shall stop * * * 'vithout first
giving an appropriate signal * * * when th.ere is
op·p·ortunity to give such signal."
Defendant offered no evidence whatsoever to show
or tend to show that p:laintiff had an op·portunity to give
-an arm signal. On the contrary the evidence clearly
demonstrates that plaintiff had no such opportunity. He
traveled about 130 feet from the light to 'vhere he made
the emergency stop. The emergency stop only became
necessary when the dog stopped. The windows of his
uutomobile were closed. The suddenness of the stop itself
is the strongest possible evidence that no opportunity
for an arm stop signal existed.
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In the ease of Sm,ith et al. v. Phili.p M orri.s Co., Inc.
Li1nited et al., (Calif. 1951), 237 P. 2d 295, plaintiff observed cars ahead slowing down. He slowed down over
a distance of 75 or 100 feet and defendant's driver struck
his automobile in the rear. The plaintiff failed to give
an arn1 signaL California has a statute similar to the
Utah Statute. It was stated:

" * * * if the court had believed that Sn1ith
suddenly stopped his car, there would be a questi.on w·hether he had an opportttt,nity to give a
signal."
The Utah Statute was never n1eant to apply to the
situation of an emergency stop. It is hard to conceive
of an emergency stop in which the driver has an opportunity to give an arm signal. The reaction time necessary
for a driver to 1nove his foot from the accelerator pedal
to the brake would hardly be a sufficient space of time
for him to roll down the window of his auto1nobile and
give an appropriate arm slow down signal. The statute
contemplates the routine ordinary driving condition
\vhere a driver decides, for reasons of his own, to slow
down or stop. Under such circumstances he has prior
knowledge which, by the exercise of ordinary care, he
can impart to other drivers upon the public highway and
thus enhance their safety. This is a far cry from the
e1nergency situation which confronted the plaintiff. In
this connection we call attention to the fact that defendant has never contended that plaintiff was negligent m
1naking the decision to stop. The sole and only testimony
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concerning the reason plaintiff stopped, is his o"Tn explanation made to defendant immediately after the collision
and before reflective consideration, and repeated under
oath at the time of trial, that he made an emergency
application of brakes to avoid striking a dog (R. 77,
165). It will he recalled that plaintiff had absolutely no
other reason for stopp·ing. He was on his. way to California, having stopp.ed at Salt Lake City for lunch, gasoline, and tire rep·airs (R. 73). He had no acquaintances
at Ameriean F'ork. After the collision and the officer's
investigation he had his car checked and continued his
trip: to California (R. 81).
There was a complete absence of evidence that the
stop was other than an emergency stop, yet the trial court
by Instruction No. 11 allowed the jury to conclude that
the stop was not an emergency stop and that consequently
plaintiff had an opportunity to give a stop signal and
was negligent in not giving such signal.
PLAINTIF:F'S FAILURE TO GIVE AN ARM
SIGNAL WAS, NOT THE PROXIMATE c·AUSE
OF THE COLLISION.
The fact that the· stop, made by plaintiff was an
emergency stop, and th~at the collision resulted so suddenly is the best evidence that a signal would have been
to no avail. Surely, if defendant was follo,Ying plaintiff
too closely to have been able to avoid collision in case of
a sudden stop by plaintiff, then it is inconceivable that
a signal of any typ·e on plaintiff's part could have avoided
the collision. Furthermore, the glow of plaintiff's brake
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light~

occurred at least as early in point of time as could
any possible arrn signal. If the glowing brake lights did
not prevent the collision, it is clear that an arm signal
'vould have been equally ineffectual.
A stop signal, even if given, would have been lost
to defendant's inattentiveness. We call attention to the
fallowing evidence :

1. Defendant's adn1ission that he looked at the
clock as he started across the inter8ection (R. 163).
:2. Defendant's confusion as to whether or not the
brake lights of plaintiff's autornobile lighted when he
stopped (R. 192).
3. The blank on the officer's report opposite the
question as to distance \vhen defendant first noticed
danger (Ex. "G").

-!. No skid n1arks \vere left by defendant's automobile (R. 175).

5. Defendant's res gestae statement to plaintiff
that he didn't see plaintiff's automobile prior to the
i1npact (R. 78).
G. The undisputed ultimate fact that defendant ran
violently against the rear of plaintiff's automobile (Ex.
·'F·").
Surely no jury question could exist under such a
state of facts on the issue of the absence of an a.rm signal
as the proximate cause of the collision.
The following cases are illustrative of the many
authorities supporting the foregoing propositions under
Point II:
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In C-urtiss v. Fahle, (Kan. 1943), 139 P. 2d 827, a
car was following a truck by about 150 feet at a sp·eed
of 45 to 50 mph. The truck swung out to pass a car, then
suddenly sla1nmed on his brakes and pulled back. Defendant noticed the sudden decrease of sp·eed and
slammed on his brakes but could not avoid the collision.
There was no signal given of the sudden decrease of
speed.
The court held that the absence of a signal '\Vas not
a proximate cause of the collision. The court cited the
case of Eldredge v. Sa.rgeant, 150 Ka.n. 824, 96 P. 2d 870,
874, as stating:
"Where the absence of lights or warning signals does not prevent a driver from seeing a
vehicle in time to avoid it, the absence of lights
or signals cannot he said to be the proximate cause
of the collision."
This case further dealt with defendant's contention here
that the statute requires a signal of intention to stop the
vehicle suddenly or to decrease its speed suddenly before
the necessity arises. The court stated:
"Such an interpretation 'vould read into the
statute a requirement to give two signals, which
the langua~ge of the statute does not warrant."
In Ritter et ux. v. Jolunson, (Wash. 1931), 300 Pac.
518, the court stated:
"While it is true that the driver of a car is
not required to be a mind reader, and that a driver
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is supposed to give a signal before stopping or
materially checking his speed, it is a matter of
common knowledge that emergency stop's often
must be made, of which there is no time to give a
signal."
In the case of Wohlenberg v. Malcewicz, (Calif.
1943), 133 P. 2d 12, the lead car suddenly slowed down
to avoid a truck and was struck in the rear by the following car. The driver of the lead car failed to give an arm
signal but stated that the brake lights \vere \Vorking. The
appellants urged contributory negligence relying on a
statute similar to the Utah Statute. It was held that the
evidence was sufficient to per1nit a finding that the slow-_
down occurred so quickly and unexpectedly that the
driver of the lead automobile had no reasonable opportunity to give an ar1n signal. The court further stated:
"Even if there were a technical violation of
the signaling statute, the trial court was amply
justified in finding that such assumed violation
was not a proximate cause of the accident."
See also:

Tackett et ux. v. Milbu.rn et al., (Wash.
1950), 218 P. 2d 298;
Caperton v. Mast, (Calif. 1948), 192 P. 2d
467·
' v. Makos, (Pa. 1951), 77 A. 2d 378,
MacNeill
366 Pa. 465;
Vienne et al. v. Chalona et al., (La. 1946),
28 So. 2d 154 ;
Cook Paint & Va,rnish Co. v. Hicklirng, ( C.C.
A. 8th, 1935), 76 F. 2d 718;
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Sniffen 1:. H1(,schle, (N.Y. 1923), 200 K.Y.S.
206;
Ri.ccio v. Ginsberg, (R. I. 1927), 139 A. 652;
Roberson. v. Rodrigue.z et al., (La. 1939),
186 So. 853;
llf cDaniel v. Capitol Transport Co. Inc., et al.,
(La. 1948), 35 So. 2d 38;
Da.n iels v. La.n gensa.n1d, (1\Io. 1936), 9G S.
w. 2d 911.

For reversal, plaintiff relies upon the refusal of
the trial court to instruct the jury as a n1atter of la'r
that plaintiff 'vas not guilty of contributory negligence.
Specifically plaintiff relies upon the reversible error
contained in the trial court's Instruction No. 11.

CONCLUSION
It is clear that there 1nust be an evidentiary basis
before an issue beco1nes one for the jury. In the absence
of an evidentiary basis such issue is one of la'v for the
court, and where the court allo~r s a jury to speculate and
conjecture to a conclusion favorable to one party but
contrary to the evidence of both parties, a serious prejudicial error results.
We respectfully sub1nit that this case should be
reversed and that plaintiff should be granted a new
trial.
Respectfullv sub1nitted
~

'

RA vVLINGS, vV ALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACI<:
JOHN L. BLACI(
'
Counsel for Appellant.
530 Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Received ------------------------ copies of the within Brief of
Appellant this-------------------------------- day of June, A. D. 1954.

Counsel for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

